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Ctco  of the  Vice  President
World Bank missions between 1948 and 1968  From the recent experience of a group of de-
identified inadequate long-tenn credit as a pri-  veloped countries, Mayer concludes that:
mary deticiency of developing countries'
financial systems.  Existing institutions provided  *  An efficient banking system is central to the
mostly short-term financing and were often  promotion of economic growth.
foreign  owned.
* The performiance  of financial markets is not
Bank missions recommended establishing  necessarily furthered by artificially lengthening
development finance companies (DFCs) to  the maturity of bank lending.
provide long-terin financing for worthwhile
(primarily industrial) projects.  *  Economic growth is not promoted through
the financing of projects.  Economists think in
The DFCs' performance has been disap-  terms of projects; bankers rarel.  lo. Banks
pointing.  Few are self-supporting; a third are in  iinance companies, not projects.  Project financ-
serious difficulty; and by 1983 half of the banks  ing can be used to stimulate economic growth
had arrears on a quarter of their loans.  By the  only in a few areas.  On the whole, economic de-
early 1980s, the Bank's wisdom in establishing  velopment depends on the promotion of corpo-
DFCs was being questioned.  rate organizations.
Mayer makes several observations about  *  Corporate organization, not project activity,
corporate finance in developed countries.  is what distinguishes developed from developing
Retentions are the dominant source of finance  countries. Economic growth relies on the
while banks are the dominant source of external  structure and quality of financial institutions.
finance.  Jn no developed country do companies
raise a substantial amount of finance from  *  An extemal agency may have technical
securities markets.  Securities markets provide  skills and financial resources, but its knowledge
an efficient means for transferring ownership  about individuals and management teams may
claims in established corporations. Mayer  be limited.  Financial assistance is only part of
attributes these phenomena to the monitoring  what is needed to create an appropriate institu-
and control function of banks, which depends on  tional structure.  Screening, monitoring, and
their managerial ability and on the costs of  rewarding individuals may often be more
bankruptcy and creditor coordination.  pertinent.
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Early  missions dispatched by the World Bank over the period
1948  to  1968  identified  inadequate  long-term  credit  as  a
primary deficiency of developing countries' financial systems.
The  response was the  recommendation that development finance
companies (DFCs) should be established with the primary aim of
providing  long-term  finance  for  worthwhile  (primarily
industrial) projects. Since existing institutions  were mainly
concerned with short term finance and often foreign owned, it
was  generally  felt necessary to  establish  new  institutions.
They were originally conceived to be privately owned, operating
under  a  sanction  and  concessional  finance  from  government.
However,  when  the  World  Bank  opened  a  loan  window  to
governmental  DFCs  in  1968 a  number  of companies came  under
state control and today a large majority are state owned.
The DFCs performance has been disappointing.  Very few are self-
supporting.  About  one-third  are  in  serious  financial
difficulties. By 1983, almost half had more than 25 percent of
their loans affected by arrears and one quarter had more than
50 percent of their loans in arrears.
Disillusionment with the performance of DFCs was one reason for
a  pronounced  shift  in  policy  away  from  the  promotion  of
financial  institutions.  A  changing  intellectual climate  was
another. Following the writings of Joseph Schumpeter, several
books appeared  in the  1950's and 1960's promoting the use of
financial institutions to stimulate economic growth. Alexander
Gerschenkron  and  Rondo  Cameron  were  the  two  best  known
proponents of this view. Frequent reference was made by these
and other authors to universal banks as the powerhouse of the
German economy and contrasts were drawn between, for example,
commercially orientated banks in Scotland and mercantile banks
in  England  in  the  eighteenth  and  nineteenth  centuries  (see
Caiaieron  (1967)).
1However, in 1973 two highly influential  books were published by
Ronald  McKinnon  and Edward  Shaw  that  attacked the  financial
intervantionist  approach. McKinnon and Shaw's main subject of
criticism was  financial repression  - the  use  of  prices  and
controls  to  limit  the  development  of  financial  markets.
Financial  repression  permitted  governments  to  exert  more
effective  control  on  the  allocation of  resources within  an
economy  and  to  finance public  sector  deficits at  low  cost.
According to McKinnon and Shaw, serious distortions resulted
that  undermined  economic  growth.  For  example,  ceilings  on
interest  rates  provide  an  unwarranted  stimulus  to  current
consumption at the expense of savings, encourage the pursuit of
low return investments and lead to an inefficient substitution
of capital for labour. Savings (and  therefore investment) were
as a consequence depressed.
By the early 1980's serious questions were being raised about
the wisdom of World Bank policie; (see, for example, World Bank
(1980)  and  Gordon  (1983)).  As  a  consequence  several
international  comparisons  of  financial  systems  were
commissioned that had  as  their  objective the development  of
broader  based  lending  programmes.  These  studies  usually
emphasized the importance of such macroeconomic considerations
as  price  stability, abolition of  interest rate  ceilings and
credit restrictions. Rather little attention was given to the
detailed operation of financial institutions.
Policies of financial liberalization in Latin America were not
a  success.  Argentina,  Brazil,  Colombia  and  Mexico  amongst
others  instituted  and  then  rapidly  abandoned  liberalization
programmes  in  the  face  of  soaring  real  interest  rates  and
damaging  international  capital  movements.  Several  Asian
countries that resisted pressures to liberalize their financial
systems fared better than South American countries that pursued
liberalization  with alacrity.
Questions were also raised at an intellectual level about the
validity of the McKinnon-Shaw model. Credit rationing models of
2Jaffea and Russell (1976)  and in particular Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981, 1983, 1986) received much attention in policy circles.
In the presence of capital market imperfections,  elimination ot
interest  rate  ceilings  is  now  no  longer  thought  to  be
necessarily  beneficial  (Cho  (1986)). Maxwell  Fry  (1988), for
example,  in  his  comprehensive  overview  of  financial
development, concludes a chapter on institutions  by saying that
"recent theoretical work on microeconomic aspects of financial
intermediation identifies an instance of market failure arising
from  asymmetric  information  between  borrowers  and  lenders.
Hence,  there  may  be  a  case  for  government  intervention".
However,  no  substitute  framework has  yet  emerged. There  is
continuing  distrust  of  policies  that  rely  on  public
institutions  or  government  intervention.  Both  Fry  and  Cho
advocate  the  development  of  financial  markets  under
appropriate macroeconomic policies as an important ingredient
of successful development policy. Cho argues that "substantial
development of an equity market  is a  necessary condition for
complete markets".
The purpose of this article is to consider what lessons can be
learnt  from  financial  systems  in  developed  countries  for
developing countries. This  is obviously a well-trodden path.
However,  there  are  two  reasons  for  believing  that  a
reexamination may be valuable at this juncture. The  first is
that research is currently in progress that  is employing new
techniques  for  evaluating  financial  performance.  These
techniques  permit  more  reliable  comparisons  of  financing
patterns in different countries to be made. The second is that
there  have  been  significant  developments  in  the  theory  of
corporate finance which  are beginning to provide a  framework
for evaluating financial arrangements.
Section 2 begins by describing the international comparisons.
Even when attention is restricted to aggregate data sources, a
number of clear patterns emerge. The first is that there are
several features of corporate financing common to all countries
in  this  study.  In  contrast  to  impressions  created  by  many
3previous  analyses, the similarities are more  pronounced than
the variations. The regularity of these results suggests some
fundamental  underlying  causes.  This  is  supported  by  the
constancy  of  these  patterns  across  time  and  industries.
Secondly,  to  the  extent  that  there  are  international
variations,  these are more pronounced between some  countries
than others.  The financial systems of different countries can
apparently be classified into a small number of groups.
The  empirical  analysis establishes  ten  stylized  facts about
corporate financing that warrant explanation.  However, until
recently, there were few theories to which one could turn for
guidance.  Traditional corporate finance theories had little to
say  about  differences  between  financial  instruments  and
institutions,  let  alone  financial  systems.  Over  the  past
decade more realism has been introduced into the assumptions of
corporate  finance  models  and  their  relevance  to  practical
issues has  increased.  However, it  would  be  unrealistic to
maintain that they offer the prospect of being able to address
the issues raised in this paper.
There  is one exception and that is a class of theories that
emphasize the relevance of control to descriptions of financial
arrangements.  The  reason  for interest in these  theories is
that  they  suggest  some  fundamental  influences  on  corporate
finance  that  appear  consistent  with  observed  behaviour.
Secti.on  3  presents  a  simple  model  of control  from i;hich  a
number of predictions about corporate finance can be derived.
These  predictions  are  then  matched  against  the  empirical
observations  from  section  2.  Explanations  from  control
theories are offered for the stylized observations.  This  is
not,  of  course,  a  demonstration of  the validity  of  control
theories but merely an attempt to provide Rrima facie evidence
of their  relevance and  to  suggest that  they  offer  a  useful
framework within  which  comparative financial systems studies
can be organized.
4Drawing policy implications  from the observations in this paper
is hazardous.  The observations  relate to a limited  time period
(1970 to 1985) and highly developed financial systems.  It is
difficult  to  know  how  they translate to  different economic,
political and social enviror.  ants.  For example, while control
theories suggest that there are serious  deficiencies associated
with securities markets as sources of finance for industry, the
creation of efficient banking systems may present even greater
difficulties in many countries.  The relative ranking of banks
and securities markets as sources of finance suggested by this
paper  may  therefore  be  reversed  at  different  times  or  in
different countries.  All that this paper can do  is to draw
inferences from the recent experience of a group of developed
countries.
The first implication comes from the observation that over the
period 1970 to 1985 securities markets made little contribution
to industrial financing in any of the developed countries of
this study.  Where external financing has been provided it has
primarily come  from banks.  Banking systems therefore appear
central to  the promotion of economic growth and  the role of
securities markets in funding investment is more opaque.
One of the insights provided by control  theories is the linking
of  finance  and  corporate management.  Financial  instruments
limit but do not extinguish external involvement in corporate
activities.  Investor  involvement  will  be  greater  where
corporate management is less able.  As corporate organizations
expand, their degree of independence increases to a point at
which  investor involvement is limited to periodic evaluations
of competing bids  for corporate control.  Only at that stage
do  security  markets  provide  an  efficient  means  by  which
ownership claims can be transferred.
Secondly, the willingness of investors to provide finance may
be conditional on their exerting a high degree of control over
corporate  activities.  This  will  be  particularly  true  of
investments of uncertain value where  investor involvement can
5stem losses.  Where withdrawal of funds is the best response to
financial  failure,  the  chosen  form  of  control  will  be  the
ability to withdraw finance at short notice.  The ausence of
long-term lending is not therefore necessarily  symptomatic of a
capital market failure  but may be an inherent characteristic of
optimal relations between investor and borrower.  Institutions
that  attempt to restrict their control by offering long-term
finance  may merely be courting financial failure.
Thirdly, and in some ways most significantly the promotion of
economic  growth  is  not  achieved  through  the  successful
financing of projects.  Economists think in terms of projects;
bankers rarely do.  For the most part, banks finance companies
not projects.  Control theory provides a  clear resolution of
these conflicting views.  According to control models, external
finance  is  limited  by  the  value  of  assets  under  investor
control.  Where the value of tangible value of assets is high
then this  limitation is not restrictive.  Project finance in
developed countries is primarily associated with precisely this
class of investments.  However, where the realization  value of
assets is small, finance that is tied to projects will be very
inhibitive.  Instead, the provision of adequate funding  will be
dependent on  intangible valuations  associated with  corporate
organization.  The financing of projects can therefore only be
used to stimulate economic growth in a limited number of areas.
Economic development more generally requires the promotion of
corporate organizations.
To summarize the policy implications of this analysis are as
follows:
(i) An efficient banking system is central to the promotion of
economic growth,
(ii) The  performance of financial markets is not necessarily
furthered by the artificial lengthening  of the maturity of bank
lending,
6(iii) Bank lending should be directed towards the development
of corporate organizations not the financing of projects.
7Section 2  The financing of industry in developed countries
There are two sources of information avai'able for studies of
aggregate corporate financing patterns in different countries.
The  first  is  national  flow-of-funds statements.  These  are
records of flows between different sectors of an economy and
between  domestic  and  overseas  residents.  The  -elevant
statement for this exercise is flows to and from non-financial
enterprises.  The second source is company accounts.  These are
constructed  on  an  individual  firm  basis  but  are  oftk-
aggregated or extrapolated  to industry or economy levels.
Both sources have their merits and deficiencies.  In theory,
flow-of-funds sta4  -stics provide a  comprehensive coverage of
transactions  between  sgctors.  Company  accounts  are  only
available for a sample, often quite small, of a country's total
corporate  sector.  However,  the  data  that  are  employed  in
company accounts are usually more reliable than flow-of-funds.
As Appendix 1 describes, flow-of-funds are constructed from a
variety of different sources that are rarely consistent.  As a
consequence, statistical adjustments are required to reconcile
entries.
As described in Mayer  (1987 and 1988) and Appendix 2 to this
paper,  the  methodology  employed  in the  Centre  for  Economic
Policy Research Study of the Financing of Industry  differs in
several  respects  from  that  used  by  previous  researchers.
Greater  emphasis  is  placed  on  flows  of  finance  instead of
stocks.  Figures are  recorded on a  net  (of accumulation of
equivalent financial assets) as  -. 1 as a gross funding basis.
Financing  proportions  are  aggregated  over  different  time
periods  using  a  weighted  as  well  as  a  simple  average  of
individual years' proportions.  The Appendix argues that these
procedures  achieve  a  greater  degree  of  international
comparability than has been available hitherto.
Tables  1,2  and  3  report  weighted  and  unweighted  average
financing  proportions  for  the  five  countries  of  the
8TAELE 1  UNWE[GHTSD  AVERA  NEr  FIN2cIIG  NIN-Fnmmc3rAL  mwaiw,SES  1970  - 1985  (1)  (FER CENn
CKNUUY(2)  FIn11AND(3)  ppANCE  GERMNY(4)  raML(!5)  jAM(N6)  UtGNr=(7)  URMnE(8)
KDK 
RLTE'IlCNS  76.4  64.4  61.4  70.9  51.9  57.9  102.4  85.9
CAPITAL
TANSFERS  0.0  0.2  2.0  8.6  7.7  0.0  4.1  0.0
SECU)RITIES  -0.8  3.7  - 0.1  -0.1  -1.3  NA  1.7  0.4
LOANS  15.2  28.1  37.3  12.1  27.7  50.4  7.6  24.4
TRADE
CREDIT  - 4.4  - 1.4  - 0.6  2.1  0.0  -11.2  - 1.1  - 1.4
BONDS  8.5  2.8  1.6  - 1.0  1.6  2.1  - 1.1  11.6
SHARES  2.5  - 0.1  6.3  0.6  8.2  4.6  - 3.3  1  .1
CTHER  1.3  7.4  - 1.4  10.9  1.0  - 3.8  3.2  -16.9
SMAIISMICAL
AniUs7MENT  1.2  - 5.0  - 6.4  0.0  3.2  NA  -13.4  - 5.1
'TrAL  99.9  100.1  100.1  99.9  100.0  100.0  100.1  100.0
SOLC:  nC  FDINIAL  S}TATISCSINE1E  2  WEIGHmD  AVERw  Z  NEI!  Fn*MiCM  OF  MUh-FnUAMC[L  inUlS 1970-9S5(1)  (9)  (FM (MN
C&MMn(2)  PINLAND(3)  ppNNC  GER"aN(4)  ITn"(5)  j"M^(6)  M-MDE(7)  UEEMI(8)
RFE5NTICNS  78.1  64.2  NA  72.6  NA  NA  107.2  89.2
CA'01MA
RANSFERS  0.0  0.2  NA  9.4  NA  NA  2.7  0.0
SECWlITIE  - 1.2  4.1  NA  - 0.1  NA  NA  2.8  1.0
LDANS  15.9  27.8  Nk  12.0  NA  NA  2.2  25.4
7WAE
CREDIT  - 3.7  - 1.8  NA  - 2.5  NA  NA  - 1.7  - 1.4
BONDS  7.2  3.2  Nk  - 1.9  NA  NA  - 2.3  11.7
oDSHWRE5  2.2  -1.4  NA  0.6  NA  NA  - 3.6  - 2.8
CIffER  1.0  6.5  NA  9.9  NA  NA  3.5  -17.2
STATISTICAL
ADJUSIMENT  0.5  -3.0  NA  0.0  NA  NA  -10.8  - 5.9
IUTAL  100.0  99.8  100.0  100.0  100.1
SCERf:  OECD  FINACIAL STATISTICSIWELE  3  MA=  ) avUR  GVss  FDWcDIG  aOF  3N-FDWIAc[L  ENRWTRISES,  1970-1985(1)  (FM  CSN
C&&MC( 2)  PINMLAND( 3)  FRANCE  cftW( 4)  jTpu(5)  JD  (6)  tiuN3( 7)  Ua.D( 8)
REE1rIcONS  54.2  42.1  44.1  55.2  38.5  33.7  72.0  66.9
CAPITAL
TRANSFRS  0.0  0.1  1.4  6.7  5.7  0.0  2.9  0.0
SH  NrTR  -
SEUWrI1E5  1.4  2.5  0.0  0.0  0.1  NA  2.3  1.4
LOANS  12.8  27.2  41.5  21.1  38.6  40.7  21.4  23.1
TAE
CREIT  8.6  17.2  4.7  2.2  0.0  18.3  2.8  8.4
BONDS  6.1  1.8  2.3  0.7  2.4  3.1  0.8  9.7
SHARES  11.9  5.6  10.6  2.1  10.8  3.5  4.9  0.8
OTHER  4.1  6.9  0.0  11.9  1.6  0.7  2.2  -6.1
STATISTICAL
ADJUSTMENT  0.8  -3.5  -4.7  0.0  2.3  NA  -9.4  -4.1
IUI!AL  99.9  99.9  99.9  99.9  99.9  100.0  99.9  100.1
SaR:  OECD  FDANCIAL STATMCSFMOM;  so  UtES 1,  2  AND  3
1.  Definitions  of  item  are  described  in  Appendix  2.  Net  financing  is  shown  as  a  proportion  of  capital  enexibtres  arxi
stockkuildirq.  Gross  financirgn  is  a  proportion  of  total  sourc.
2.  For  Canada,  ztgs  are  included  in  loans,  foreign  investmnts  are  include  in  other  and  capital  transfers  are  inwlued
in  retertimis.
3.  Data  on  Finlard  refer  to  the  period  1969  to  1984.  Errors  in  the  oem  statistics  have  required  that  the  statistical
adjustment  be  altered  as  follows:  1971,  DM  2  billion  and  1973,  +UK 89  billion.
4.  There  is  no  statistical  adjustment  in  rerman  aoccmts.  FUnids  placed  with  insurance  ocopanies  and  building  and  loam
associations  are  included  in  loans.
5.  The  Italian  statistical  adjustment  was reduced  by  12,070  billion  in  1974 to  make accounts  balanc.  Trade  credit  is  not
recorded  as  a  separate  item  in  Italian  flow-of-furds.
6.  Japanese  flow-of-furds  do  not  report  retentions.  The  ratio  of  external  to  internal  finanoing  of  Japanese  enterprises  has
been  obtained  by  applyiuq  proportions  recorded  in  aggregate  cxozany  acomunts  for  the  period  1972-84,  as  shamn in  Tables  4
and  5.  The Japanese  figures  therefore  have  to  be  treated  with  particular  caution.  Short-temn  seowrities  are  included  in
btds.
f  7.  United  Kingdcm  statistics  refer  to  private  enterprises  only;  were  public  enterprise  to  be  included  then  entries  would
read  as  follows:
CAPITAL  SHORr-'TERM  TRADE  SrATISlICAL
RETE2Ia4S  ThANSFES  SEBRITRES  LOANS  CREDIT  BONDS  SHARES  anD  I  ADJLMGI
UNWEICHrED  NET  91.9  5.7  1.3  11.7  -0.7  -0.9  -2.5  2.1  -8.5
(TABLE  1)
WEICHTED  NET  97.5  4.2  2.1  5.9  -1.1  -1  7  -2.6  2.4  -6.5
(TABLE  2)
UNWEICHrED  G1R0S  67.9  4.2  1.9  22.4  3.6  0.6  3.9  1.9  -6.4
(TABLE  3)8.  The  followinq  modificatm  wexe miae  to  the  U.S.  statistical  adjust2mnt  to  make a  balanoe:  (Million  dollars)
1970  1971  1973  1975  1976  1979  1981  1982  1983  1984
-1  -3  +3  +1  -2  +2  -1  +1  -2  -1
Capital  transfers  are  ixluded  under  retenticns  in  U.S.  acxxmts.  AxFuisitions  of  central  government  shert-term
secarities  are  not  shmn  seprately  f  b  s  and  have  been  subtracted  from  isses  of  bonxis in  Table  2.
9.  The weights  used in  Table  2  (The  producp  of  revaluation  and  depreciation  factors)  are  as  follows:
1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985
CANAIb  0.20  0.39  0.55  0.69  0.74  0.78  0.84  0.88  0.91  0.89  0.89  0.89  0.89  0.93  0.97  1.00
FlDMAND 0.29  0.52  0.70  0.85  0.90  0.86  0.87  0.91  0.91  0.98  1.01  0.94  0.97  0.97  0.99  1.00
GERY  0.11  0.22  0.32  0.40  0.46  0.53  0.59  0.76  0.71  0.75  0.78  0.81  0.87  0.92  0.96  1.00
co  UNrE
m  KDlcX  0.32  0.58  0.79  0.89  0.90  0.91  0.93  0.95  0.95  0.90  0.87  0.89  0.93  0.97  0.99  1.00
STASI  0.17  0.33  0.47  0.59  0.62  0.67  0.73  0.77  0.78  0.80  0.79  0.78  0.81  0.89  0.94  1.00international study (France,  Germany,  Japan, the U.K. and U.S.)
and  for  Canada,  Finland  and  Italy  using  flow-of-funds
statistics.  Table  1  reports  unweighted  averages  of  net
financing  as  a  proportion  of  capital  expenditures  and
stockbuilding.  Table  2  shows  weighted  averages  of  net
financing using straight line depreciation over 16 years from
1970 to  1985.  Table  3  records unweighted averages of gross
financing as a proportion of total sources of finance. 1 The
weighted and unweighted averages are similar.
Observation 1  Retentions are the dominant source of finance in
all countries.
The U.K. has the highest proportion of retentions (107 percent
excluding  public  enterprises,  97  percent  including  public
enterprises on a weighted net financing basis).  Italy has the
lowest  but,  even  here,  over half  of  investment in physical
assets and stocks is funded from retentions.
This is not just a consequence  of the procedure of netting uses
of  finance  from  sources.  Even  on  a  gross  basis  U.K.
corporations  obtain  just  over  70  per  cent  of  their  total
sources from retentions and U.S. corporations just under 70 per
cent.
Observation  2  There  are  some  marked  variations  in  self-
financing ratios  across  countries.  In the U.K.  and U.S.A.,
more  than  three-quarters  of  investment  is  funded  from
retentions.  In Finland, France, Japan and Italy, appreciably
1 There  is  a  strong  similarity  between  the  financing
proportions recorded for the U.S. in Table 3 and those reported
in Goldsmith (1965) for earlier periods. Goldsmith reports the
following for the period 1946 to 1958:
Retentions  Loans  Bonds  Equities
58.2  25.7  9.6  6.4
9more  is  raised  externally. Canada and Germany  lie somewhere
between the two groups.
Observation 3  In no country do companies raise a substantial
amount of finance from securities  markets.
Summing  together  short-term  securities,  bonds  and  shares
reveals that the largest  amount raised in securities  markets is
19 per cent in Canada on a gross basis (i.e. as a proportion of
total sources) and 13 per cent on a net basis in the U.S.A.  In
Germany  and  the  U.K.,  net  amounts  raised  from  these  three
sources were negative and gross amounts  were only 3 per cent in
Germany  and  8  per  cent  in the U.K.  Only  in Canada  and the
U.S.A.  do  bond  markets  raise  a  significant  proportion  of
external finance for industry.
Observation  4  Banks  are  the  dominant  source  of  external
finance in all countries.
Observation  5  Bank  finance  is  particularly pronounced  in
France, Italy and Japan.  It represents a surprisingly small
proportion of German corporate financing.
Bank finance accounts for approximately 40 per cent of gross
sources in France, Italy and Japan.  In Germany, the U.K. and
the U.S.A.  it only contributes  around  20 per  cent  of total
sources.  Netting off deposits this falls to 8 per cent in the
U.K.  Rather  strikingly  then  there  is  no  support from these
figures for the commonly held view that German banks contribute
a  substantial amount to the financing of their industry  (see
Carrington and Edwards (1979)).
Comparing the gross and net financing tables demonstrates some
of  the  problems  associated  with  interpreting gross  funding
figures.  In  some countries,  trade credit  appears to  be  an
important  source  of  finance,  in particular  in  Finland  (see
Table 3).  But much of this is intra-corporate sector and does
not  _-ontribute  to  total  net  financing.  Table  1  correctly
10records that overall non-financial  enterprises  are suppliers of
credit to other sectors, in particular consumers.
Comparing Tables  1  and  3  reveals that U.K. enterprises have
been particularly heavy purchasers of financial assets.  This
has been  primarily in the  form of deposits but purchases of
shares have also been large.  Acquisitions of financial assets
in the U.S.A. mainly  take the  form of  intra-sector flows of
trade  credit  and  purchases  of  domestic  shares  and  overseas
assets.
The  quality  of  some  flow-of-funds  data  is  questionable.
Statistical adjustments reveal  inconsistencies between series
and the coverage of some items, in particular trade credit, is
known to be inadequate.  U.K. data are particularly  deficient in
this respect.  Table 1 recorded the fact that the statistical
adjustment averaged 13 per cent of gross investment over the
period  1970 to  1985 - approximately twice that of any other
country.
Tables 4 and 5 repeat the financing proportion exercise using
company accounting data where they are available.  There is a
strong similarity in the  financing patterns that emerge  from
the two sources of data.  However, there are a few differences.
Bank  loans  are  more  significant  in  Finland  but  much  less
significant  in the U.K.  than  suggested by the  flow-of-funds
data.  Bonds  are  even  more  significant in  the U.S.A.  as a
source  of  finance  for  industry  than  flow-of-funds  data
indicate.
Average  financing ratios  therefore look  similar for the  two
sources of data.  However, nothing has been said to date about
the extent to which these proportions  have changed over time or
the correlation between different forms of finance.  Flow-of-
funds data are too short (16 observations per country for the
series standardized by the OECD) to provide accurate guidance
on either of these questions.  In contrast, company accounting
information has been collected for nearly 40 years in the U.K.
11TWBLE  4  UfWE[GHD  AVERAG  NEI FIQNhCDXG  OF NM+-FfNlNCIAL  0DFEORWIC1E  (PER (
FIAND  E  JAPAN  IN  SME
PERIOD  1975-84  1976-84  1972-84  1970-85
RETIETlONS  66.4  66.9  57.9  87.9
CAPITAL
TRANSFERS  1.8  1.2  NA  0.0
SHORr-TERN  3.1  0.0
SECURITIES  36.1  NA
LANS  34.7  46.2  10.8
TADE
CREDIT  -7.2  2.5  -8.6  -2.5
BONDS  1.1  15.8
-6.7  0.2
SHARES  -2.4  -1.3
OTHER  4.8  0.0  2.4  -3.9
STATISTICAL
ADJUSITERr  -2.4  0.0  1.9  -6.9
'IUIPJJ  99.9  100.0  100.0  100.0
SOURCE:  COMPANY  ACOOUNIS  AS RESORTED  IN
OKED FINANCAL  STATISTICSTNBLE  5  UMWEDGNThD  AVERAG  FGOSINiClG  OF N0N-FDlACIAL  CDRPORATICNS  (PER CENM)
FMNAND  FRANCE  JAPA  MWl!  SE
PSRIOD  1975-84  1976-84  1972-84  1970-85
REThITICNS  41.3  36.1  33.7  64.6
CAPITAL
TRANSFERS  1.0  0.6  NA  0.0
SHORI-IERM  2.2  NA  1.5
SEBCURTIES  31.3
WDANS  34.5  36.4  12.5
TRADE  CREDIT  13.0  25.4  15.0  10.4
BONDS  0.6  2.1  12.5
6.6
SHARES  4.3  4.9  4.0
O11IR  4.6  0.0  7.8  -0.2
STATISTICAL
ADJUSBTMEr  -1.6  0.0  0.0  -5.2
IOThL  99.1  100.1  99.9  99.8Graphs  1  and  2  are  based  on  aggregate  company  accounting
information.  In interpreting  the graphs it should be borne in
mind that there was a significant  change in sampling procedures
in 1977. 2  The graphs suggest  the following observations:
Observation  6:  UK  investment has been consistently financed
from  retentions  (91 percent on  average).  Bank  finance has
contributed  close  to  zero  (3 per cent on average) on a  net
basis. 3
Observation 7:  There is a strong inverse relation between the
proportion  of  expenditure  financed  from retentions  and bank
credit.
Confirmation  for observation  7  comes  from  an examination of
correlations  between  different  forms  of  finance.  Table  6
records the correlation  between retentions and other sources of
finance.  Retentions  are  strongly  inversely correlated with
trade credit  and bank  credit on both a gross and net basis.
The fact that this is true of gross as well as net bank credit
indicates that short- term financing requirements  are satisfied
by raising bank loans as well as reducing cash balances.
Despite only  having  a  short time  series available for other
countries,  Table  7 reveals a remarkable consistency in this
pattern of correlations.  Loans and trade credit are inversely
related to retentions in all countries.  On a net basis (Table
8), the strong inverse relation with loans remains.  However,
with trade credit the correlation is considerably weakened and
in many cases eliminated.  This may be just a reflection of the
poor quality of trade credit data in flow-of-funds statistics
or an indication of the intra-corporate sector nature of the
2 See Appendix 1 for details.
3  It is only slightly in excess of this on a gross basis
- 6 per  cent on average.
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GS  saUC  NET  Sa
REaI0NS  TRADE  BANK  LGER  NE  Eviny  ARE  BANK  SECURITIES v HDrr  CRa  Trr  DE  ISrU  CErr  Cimrr  ISSED
INVES1iE2r  .23  -. 17  .13  -. 11  -.08  .66  .15  -.41
PXrEN'D'CN4S  1.00  -.73  -.73  -.07  .03  -.51  -.83  -.23
SCaRC:  GOUDIE  AND  NEW
NaW:  (I)  Gross  and  net  sairxes  are  defined  as  a  percentage  of  total  gros  and  net  scKaces  respectively.  Investment  and retentions  are  definred  as  a  percentage  of  total  gross  saure  for  the  first  five  colums  and  retentions  is defined  as  a  percentage  of  total  net  sources  (i.e.  physical  investment)  for  the  last  three  o1lums.  The absolute  value  of  irwestment  is  used  in  the  last  three  columns.TRBLE 7  Cr  G51  EELaEN  HIRCCRTIES  OF RIEENTIS  AND PIDPRCMINS  OF CDI  YNS  OP
GRO  FnWKZ
l  cFMAPND  FRANC  GERNY  ID  JlM  UNr  KDlM  I  Stl
OF
SEClUPrITES  .05  -. 58  .00  .02  .34  NA  -. 11  -. 31
LOANS  -. 78  -. 43  -. 37  -. 59  -. 74  NA  -. 73  -. 45
TRADE  CRErT  -. 40  -. 33  -. 37  -. 36  NA  NA  -.69  -. 84
BvONI  .16  -. 14  .43  -. 55  -. 32  NA  -. 34  .42
SHARES  -. 01  .26  -. 25  .05  -. 12  NA  .45  -. 20TN3LE  8  EAT  a2EIS  BErTE  POPORTIQE  OF RITNfQIC  AND RFCXlEDG6  OF
OHM  iui  OF Fnwic
QF !  nFRM-  mD  J  e  ur  N  UN  S!SD
OF
SECURRITIE  - 0.54  -0.67  - 0.40  - 0.01  - 0.52  NA  - 0.25  - 0.40
LOANS  - 0.78  - 0.47  - 0.45  - 0.57  - 0.88  NA  - 0.70  - 0.67
TRADE  CREDrr  0.03  - 0.40  - 0.41  - 0.07  NA  NA  0.02  0.01
BONDS  - 0.30  0.12  0.13  - 0.76  - 0.03  NA  - 0.36  0.02
SHARES  0.72  - 0.17  - 0.47  0.32  0.05  NA  - 0.10  - 0.09transaction, not  fully  revealed by  the  partial  coverage  of
company accounts.
Observation  8:  Securities  markets  have  declined  in
significance  as sources of finance for British industry.  Trade
credit  increased in importance at the end of the 1960's and
early 1970's. 4
Quite  surprisingly,  there  is  no  evidence  of  financial
innovation and deregulation being associated with a  growth in
the contribution of market sources  of finance. 5
4  Comparisons of financing  proportions in Footnote 1 with
Table 3 suggests that a similar decline has occurred in the US
over the second World War period.  Taggart (1986)  demonstrates
that  the  decline has  been  a  long-run one.  He  reports the
following  financing  proportions  for  US  non-financial
corporations since the turn of the century:
(per  cent)
Short-term  Bonds &
Period  Retentions  Liabilities  Mortgages  Equities
Equities
1901-12  55  8  23  14
1923-29  55  4  22  19
1949-53  64  16  14  6
1979-83  63  26  9  2
5  That observation is not dependent on netting uses from
sources.  Issues of long-term liabilities and shares averaged
as follows:
1950-59  1960-69  1970-79  1980-84
Long-term liabilities  7.5  10.8  5.6  -0.7
Shares  ll.i  14.9  8.5  8.0
However,  it should be borne  in mind  that pre- and post-1977
data are not directly comparable.
13Cross-sectional  evidence  suggests  that  high  retention
proportions  in  the  UK  are  not  merely  a  consequence  of  low
industrial  growth.  Two  relatively  high  growth  industrial
sectors, chemicals and allied firms, and electrical engineering
recorded financing proportions that were equal to or in excess
of those in other industries (Table  9).
However, there are marked differences in financing proportions
of different size of firms within industries.  Since 1977, the
Department of  Trade  &  Industry has categorized  firms by  two
size groups: large, and medium and small companies. 6  Table 10
records the following 7:
Observation 9:  Small and medium sized firms are considerably
more reliant on external finance than large firms.  A smaller
proportion  of  small  than  large  company  finance  comes  from
securities markets.
Confirmation for the  greater role of banks  in small  company
financing comes from an examination of stock as well as flow
proportions in Table 11.
However, it should be borne  in mind that  pre- and post-1977
data are not directly comparable.
6  For  the  period  shown  in  Table  10  large  firms  are
defined  as  those  with  capital  employed  of  more  than  £4.16
million.
7 Goldsmith  (1958) records a similar distinction between
small and large firms in the U.S. in an earlier period.  Gross
financing  proportions for the period 1946 to 1952 were:
(per  cent)
Retentions  Bank Loans  Bonds and  Equities  Other
and Trade  Mortgages
Credit
300 large  59.1  7.2  14.1  8.1  11.3
Corporations
All other  53.0  22.7  12.6  5.0  6.8
Corporations
14q[E  9  na  Q  n  I  1WD  DmlUSIS  IN  UI  U.K.
qUL  CHEICs  ES BTmchL  IhL  NC1i  E  CL
SA  P  ID  AND  wZ.:r  DamAND  ALnIMa
RE'DISNIICN5  59.1  62.7  59.2  91.0  89.7  117.3
TRADE CDIT  17.5  12.7  17.1  1.5  - 2.2  - 11.9
BANK  CREDIT  5.6  3.2  1.6  2.7  - 2.2  - 20.4
IJiBILITIES  6.8  13.3  6.7
4.8  14.7  15.0
I5SUE5 OF  10.9  8.0  15.4
SHARES
%TXL  99.9  99.9  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
SO:  GOXJDIE  AND MEX5,  BJSIESS  m  usS  (IS3)
NClES:  (I)  All  averages  are  umweighted.
(II)  The  total  sanple  refers  to  the  period  1949 to  1984.
Chemical6  and allied  and  elecrical  engineerigx  industries  relate  to  the  period  1949 to  1982.TARE  10  FnDWMWG F1'1Q  OF  IAw  AND N)LhI  AND 3.IL  SIZH)  CIFANIS  IN  11  U.L:
ARAGE  1977  TD 1982
BMW,  TURI'-1M  IS0S  OF  OUtER
REM32MCNS  IBUl  AND TRE  S-  AND 
CR;D17CIRS  lc  I  r
ALL  OMANIES
IARtE  70.9  23.2  5.7  0.2
MEDIUM
AND SM4LU  52.6  45.7  1.3  0.3
CMICAL  AN
LARE  70.5  20.2  7.6  1.6
MEDIUM
AND SMLL  50.3  50.5  3.8  - 4.7
ELEC1CAL  aC'ANIES
LARE  79.4  19.4  3.1  - 1.9
MEDIUM
AND SKALL  60.4  37.4  2.4  0.1
SRCXE:  BUSnlESS  MN?DWR  (M3)TABLE  11  PROPORTION  OF STOCK OF BANK AND SHORT-TERM  LOANS  TO
TOTAL  SHORT-  AND  LONG-TERM  DEBT:  AVERAGE  1977 TO 1982
ALL QQPJIIS  66
LARGE  COMPANIES  63
MEDIUM AND SMALL  87
COMPANIES
CHEMICAL  COMPANIES  47
LARGE  CHEMICALS  46
MEDIUM  AND  SMALL  93
CHEMICALS
ELECTRICAL  COMPANIES  73
LARGE  ELECTRICALS  66
MEDIUM AND  SMALL  94
ELECTRICALS
SOURCE:  BUSINESS  MONITORS  (M3)
NOTE:  BANK LOANS  RELATE  TO  BOTH  SHORT-  AND  LONG-TERM  LOANS.
THE  TABLE  IS  NOT THEREFORE  INFORMATIVE  ABOUT MATURITY OF  DEBTS.
14-cObservation  10:  Bank  (and short-term)  finance account  for
approximately two-thirds of UK  companies total debt but more
than five-sixth  of small companies total debt.
These ten stylized facts warrant explanation.
15Section 3  A control theory of corporate finance
Until recently there would have been little theoretical basis
on which to attempt an explanation of these observations.  In
the presence of complete markets and in the absence of taxation
and  bankruptcy  costs,  finance  is  irrelevant  to  corporate
valuations.  In the presence of taxation, costs of capital can
differ appreciably across different forms of finance.  However,
taxation  has  not  been  successful  at  explaining  financing
patterns either  across or within countries  (see Mayer  (1987)
and (1988)).  Furthermore,  many of the ten observations relate
to statements about intermediation not  financial instruments-
a subject on which theory is almost silent.
There  have,  however,  been  some  developments  in  corporate
finance theory which hold out the possibility that a framework
for  explaining  financing  patterns  may  emerge.  The  most
relevant of these are theories that relate corporate finance to
corporate  control.  They  have  been  described  informally  in
Mayer  (1987 and 1988).  More rigorous theoretical models have
been presented in Aghion and Bolton  (1988) and Mayer  (1989).
The  purpose  of  the  presentation  here  is  to  suggest  the
relevance of these models to the observations described above
and, in the next section, the design of financial systems for
economic  development.
The starting point of these models is to relax the assumption
of complete markets and contracts.  In the presence of complete
contracts, it is possible to specify reward and penalties  in
such a way as to achieve Pareto optimal outcomes in all states.
Divergences  of  interests  between  different  agents  can  be
eliminated through appropriate contract specification.  It is
where  incompleteness  is  unavoidable  or  only  achievable  at
prohibitive  cost  that  moral  hazard  or  adverse  selection
problems arise.
Consider the most straightforward  case.  Suppose that there are
two  agents,  only  one  of  whom  (agent  1)  is  endowed  with
16financial wealth.  Agent  1 can be regarded as the Lank.  If
agent  1  has  a  take  control of the asset he can generate a
return of Vl. Vl is the liquidation or reorganization value of
the asset.  Agent  2  requires a  return of at least y2 to be
willing to run the capital asset (the opportunity cost of his
human capital). 8 If iVj is the value of the asset under the
control of individual i to individual j then 1V  = yMl 2v1 =  vi
and  2V2 =  2V  - Vl where  iV- =  ivi.  Therefore  Agent  2 should
be in control  provided  that  2V  - V2 > Vl.
There are then two ways in which one can proceed to establish a
relation between finance and control.  The first, which is the
line taken by Aghion  and Bolton, is to assume that  financial
performance  is  informative  about  the  desirability  of
alternative  allocation  of  control.  If  the  only  aspect  of
performance that  is observable is cash  flow then a  contract
that  is  conditional  on  ability  to  service  a  financial
obligation may be sought.  A debt contract meets that need.  It
allocates control to the manager, entrepreneur or shareholder
in states in which interest and principal obligations can be
paid and transfers control to the creditor where they cannot.
The  link  with  finance here  comes  from the  observability of
financial returns.  This approach bears a close resemblance to
a particular class of signalling model due to Miller and Rock
(1985) where  dividends  are  informative about  companies  cash
flows.  The advantage of the Aghion and Bolton approach over
earlier models  is that  it provides  a  rationale  for setting
payments to investors in terms of the relative productivity of
different classes of investor in controlling the activities of
firms.
The link between control and finance that Mayer emphasizes is
the claim that investors can make in the event of a default.
8 No  distinction  is being  drawn here  between  entry  and
exit valuations. This is an important simplification. For the
implications of its relaxation see Mayer  (1989).
17Suppose that Agent 2's earnings are continuously increasing in
the value  of expropriations from Agent 1.  Expropriation may
arise  from direct transfer, slack, the pursuit of managerial
objectives, investment in unduly risky activities and a range
of  other  activities  that  diminish  investors' wealth.  The
assumption that  earnings are continuously increasing implies
that  the  value  that  agent  2  attaches  to  expropriations
increases at a faster rate than her human capital suffers from,
for example, loss of reputation.  This is a strong assumption
and we return to it below.  If that is the case, then agent 1
will be unwilling to invest more than Vl knowing that that is
the amount which can be extracted from the firm in the event of
default  and the  amount which  can therefore be expected when
agent 2 is in control.
The two models are obviously clearly related.  Mayer's differs
from Aghion and Bolton by emphasizing exogenous influences on
the capital structure of firms reflecting the value of assets
under alternative management.  It is this that determines the
amount of finance that agent 1 is willing to provide.  A host
of  instruments  may  then  be  employed  to  effect  transfer  of
control  when  different  signals  suggest  that  the  default
valuation  (yI)  is  being  violated.  A  variety  of  covenant
restrictions as  well  as  interest and principal payments  are
commonly employed.
Where  the  inverse  relation  between  agent  1  and  agent  2
valuations does  not hold, valuations in excess  of Vl  can be
sustained.  In that case the valuation that agent 1 attributes
to agent 2 control is associated with those actions by agent 2
that  maximize  2V1. If  2V,  - V2 =  V1 >  Vl corresponding  to
those  actions then agent 1 will be willing to contribute up to
an amount  V1. In the extreme  where  V2 =  V2 Vl  2V. - y2.
Before  discussing  the  implications of this  analysis  for  the
above  observations  on  financing,  it  is  worth  noting  some
attractive  features of  the  approach.  First,  it provides  a
rigorous basis for encapsulating some of the features of agency
18and managerial models that previous models have not.  Secondly,
it provides the rationale for the existence  of a multiplicity
of  financial  instruments  (short- and  long-term  finance  and
covenants) that traditional finance models have been unable to
explain.  Thirdly,  it  provides  predictions  about  corporate
capital structure that are readily testable.
We turn to  this  last point now.  It  is hypothesized that a
control model gives rise to the following  predictions:
Prediction 1:  Gearing levels will be high where the value of
assets under creditor management is high.
Comment:  High values  of yl  should be associated with large
external financing.
Prediction 2:  Assets which are not specific to their current
employment will attract more external finance.
Comment:  Assets that are specific to their current employment,
e.g. intangibles, will have a low value of Vl.
Prediction 3:  Where the costs of organizing external control
are high,  there will be little  external finance.
Comment:  If  it is  costly to organize a  disparate group  of
investors  then  the  degree  of  control  that  they  would  be
expected  to  exert  is  small.  Likewise,  the  provision  of
external finance may be constrained by bankruptcy costs.
Prediction  4:  The  relation between  control and  finance is
weakened  where  interests  of  investor  and  manager  do  not
diverge.
Comment:  Prediction 4 follows immediately from the observation
that investors will be willing to provide more than yl where
Vl  >  vl.
19The determinants of corporate capital structure are therefore:
1. The managerial ability of creditors (prediction  1),
2. The nature of assets (prediction  2),
3. Bankruptcy and creditor coordination  costs (prediction  3),
4. Non-financial controls on managerial opportunism
(prediction  4).
The first five observations on the dominant role of retentions,
low contributions from security markets and the importance of
banks in some countries are consistent with predictions 1 and
3.  If external intervention is costly because creditors are
either poor managers or difficult to organize, then own finance
will  dominate  (observation 1)  and  be  particularly  large  in
countries  in  which  management  and  finance  are  separated
(observation  2).  Creditors that are dispersed and difficult to
organize will  play an  especially small role  (observation 3).
Instead, finance will come from intermediaries (observation  4)
that  are  closely  integrated  into  their  corporate  sectors
(observation  5).
The  relation  between  finance  and  control  is  particularly
evident  in  the  provision  of  working  capital.  The  main
providers  of  working  capital  (banks  and  trade  creditors-
observation 7) also have the most direct claim on assets in the
event of default (fixed  and floating charges).  The ability to
trigger  these  claims  automatically  with  little  direct
managerial input means that institutions  can smooth cash flows
even where  their longer term involvement is small  (comparison
of observations 2 and 7).
Predictions 2 and 3 help to account for observations 9 and 10.
Small  and  newly-formed  companies  have  a  low  intangible
(goodwill) to tangible valuation ratio.  Therefore a  smaller
proportion  of  their  assets  are  specific  to  their  current
20employment and  investors can  realize a  larger proportion  of
their ongoing value in the event of default.  As a consequence,
the external financing ratio of small companies is higher than
average  (observation 9) and  finance is provided by investors
who can take control at low cost (observation  10).  By way of a
corollary, it is worth noting that capital mai-ket  deficiencies
will be particularly pronounced in firms with a high proportion
of  intangible assets  (i.e. companies involved in substantial
research and  development  (R and  D)  programmes) and  few own
resources.  This  is  consistent  with  the  Schumpetarian
hypothesis that product market dominance is required to provide
finance for R and D.
As for the other two observations not included in Table 1, the
apparent  constancy  of  financing  patterns  (observations  6)
supports  the  emphasis  that  is  placed  on  structural  factors
(quality of management, nature of assets and costs of creditor
coordination) by control models.  The decline in the proportion
of certain classes of external finance (observation  8) probably
then reflects a shift in the balance of corporate and investor
control  as  the  complexity  of  corporate  organizational
arranger.¢ents  increases in the U.K.
Observations on international  patterns of corporate finance are
therefore suggestive of the  relevanca of control theories of
finance.  However, there  is one observation that at least at
first  sight  appears  inconsistent  with  control  theories.
Despite having a banking system that is closely integrated with
its corporate sector, German  industry raises a  comparatively
modest  proportion  of  its  finance  in  the  form  of  loans
(observation 5).9  Prediction 4 was that the relation between
finance  and  control  would  breakdown  where  investor  and
9 There are, of course, numerous other services that
German universal banks provide for their customers,
for example, bond and equity issuing facilities,
and portfolio management services for investors.  In
addition, banks were probably a more important source
of finance in earlier periods.
21management interests do not diverge.  This description, it is
suggested, is applicable to German bank-investor relations.
Schonfield  (1965)  in  his  classic  account  of  the  German
financial system saw banks as the prefects of German industry.
Their power derived from their equity investments,  their proxy
votes  and  their  representation  on  supervisory  boards  (the
Aufsichtsrat).  Knight  (1988) views  the  relation  as  more
advisory than dictatorial and echoes the sentiments of German
bankers  when  he  concludes  "the evidence then  points  to  the
banks as sometimes providing companies with independent,  well-
informed  and well-connected non-executive  chairmen able to make
a powerful contribution to the board's performance" (p. 15).
Consensus  or  command,  the  need  for  financial  control  is
lessened by  the  other  instruments that German banks  have at
their disposal.
22Section 4  Implications for Economic Development
There  are  clearly  numerous  implications of  both  theory  and
observations for the design of financial systems. This section
will  restrict  attention  to  the  issues  raised  in  the
introduction.
Over  the  past  decade,  policy  towards  the  financing  of
developing cot'ntries  has shifted from government and banks as
sources of  economic growth  towards  financial liberalization.
As  the quote  from the article by Cho suggests, part of that
liberalization programme has been seen to be the development of
security and in particular equity markets.  However, one of the
most  consistent  patterns  to  emerge  from  the  international
comparisons  was  the  small  level  of  financing  provided  by
security markets.  Banks  in all developed countries are  the
primary source of external funding.
Control  models  of  finance  help  to  explain  the  apparent
divergence  between  theory  and  practice.  The  feature  that
control models  emphasize  is the relation between finance and
management.  Traditionally,  financial  instruments  have  just
been  regarded  as  alternative  mechanisms  for  sharing  risks
between  investors.  It  almost  immediately  follows  that
impediments to the smooth functioning  of financial markets are
undesirable.  However, according to control theories, a primary
distinguishing feature of financial instruments is the degree
of  involvement  that  they  confer  on  different  classes  of
investors.  Those  who  are best  placed  to  exert  control.  if
circumstances demand  it will  hold  the  financial instruments
with  the  largest  element  of  control and  the most  extensive
provisions for interference in corporate  management.
Within the confines of contLol theories, finance can be seen as
a  layer  of  manajement.  Firms  determine  the  allocation  of
resources  across  projects;  banks  allocate  resources  between
firms; and central banks allocate resources between banks and
industries.  In the presence of limited managerial resources,
23which  I  contend  is  the  primary  impediment  to  economic
development, the best management will have to be concentrated
at  the  apex  of  this  hierarchy.  The  role  of  financial
institutions is then  to  extend management skills  through an
economy at large.  The major impediment  to this is the absence
of  intangible  valuations  in  an  underdeveloped  economy.
Reputations  are  in  short  supply  and  the  ability to  sustain
valuations in excess of minimum amounts that can be realized is
very  limited.  Control  is therefore a  central component of
financial  involvement  in  developing  country  industry  and
financial  instruments  that  permit  direct  involvement  in the
allocation process at low cost will be sought.
The picture of economic development that this suggests is one
in which bank involvement is required  at early stages.  This is
not so much a consequence of market failures  of other financial
instruments as  commonly described but simply a  reflection of
the limited availability of managerial resources and the fact
that those resources are best deployed at the higher levels of
a  country's  economic  activities.  As  economic  development
progresses, there comes a point at which management skills of
the  corporate  sector equal  or  exceed those within  financial
institutions and the direct  control exerted by the  financial
sector  diminishes.  At  that  stage,  less  involvement of  the
financial system  in the  funding or control of the  corporate
sector is to be expected and control internal to the corporate
sector (takeovers)  supercedes it.
Controls on the banking sector  within this framework should not
therefore necessarily be regarded as unwarranted interference
with  markets  but  as  part  of  the  overall management  of  the
growth  of  companies  and  financial  systems.  There  is,  of
course, no presumption in any of this that bank or government
involvement will be successful.  The potential abuses that can
occur in the presence of dominant bureaucracies  and suppression
of competition  are well  known.  Financial liberalization may
well  be  preferred  to  corrupt,  inefficient  and  oppressive
bureaucracies.  However, economic development, beyond the mere
24avoidance  of  the  worst  abuses  of  the control  of resources,
necessitates the  establishment of  appropriate  management  by
governments and banks.  How that it is to be achieved is not
the proper  subject of this paper.  It may, though, be worth
noting that one feature of successful companies and economies
that  may  be  relevant  here  is  the  infusion of  limited but
controlled  competition between a  small  number  of groups  and
firms.  In  any  event,  finance  is  almost  certainly  a  key
instrument of that management.
Two results flow from this almost by implication.  The first is
that assertions about the desirability  of particular classes of
finance are probably naive.  The absence of long-term finance
is not  a  capital market  failure.  The problem  is that  the
economic conditions do  not exist to encourage its provision.
Simply  making  long-term  finance available where  it has  not
previously  been  supplied  is  almost  certainly  a  recipe  for
financial disaster.  Restrictions on maturities are important
forms of control on corporate activity.  They allow investors
to  intervene  where  conditions  demand  it  and  they  therefore
allow  corporate valuations  to be  sustained at  higher  levels
than  would  otherwise  be  possible.  There  are  costs  to  the
absence of long-term credit markets (see, for example,  Mayer
(1989)) but  these  reflect more  underlying deficiencies than
those  suggested  by  the  proponents  of  development  finance
companies.
The  second  implication  is  that  the  objective  of  economic
development should be the promotion of the growth of firms not
the  initiation  of  projects.  Economic  systems  remain
rudimentary so  long as  intangible valuations  (goodwill) that
permit organizations to operate without direct investor control
do  not  exist.  The  World  Bank  in  sponsoring  projects  not
companies  is  therefore  failing  to  establish  the  basis  for
sustained growth.  It  is corporate organization not  project
activity  that  distinguishes  developed  from  developing
countries.  This  presents  a  difficulty  because,  while  an
external  agency  may  have  technical  skills  and  financial
25resources, its knowledge about individuals  and management teams
may be limited.  Economic growth is therefore crucially reliant
on the structure and quality of financial institutions and it
is towards an improvement in those that most attention should
be directed.  Financial assistance  will be only one part of the
process  of  creating  an  appropriate  institutional structure.
Screening, monitoring and rewarding of individuals  will in many
cases be more pertinent.
26Appendix 1: Alternative sources of data
There  are two  sources of information on corporate financing:
flow-of-funds  statistics  and  company  accounts.  Company
accounts are  available on an individual firm basis;  flow-of-
funds  are aggregated  across sectors.  For this purpose, the
relevant flow-of-funds  sector is non-financial enterprises.
The  primary  advantage  of  flow-of-funds data  is  that  their
coverage is comprehensive.  In contrast, company accounts are
only available  for a  limited number of firms and samples are
frequently a  small proportion  (by number) of all enterprises.
On the  other  hand,  definitions of  enterprise sectors differ
across  countries.  In  theory,  Standard  National  Accounting
(SNA)  conventions  stipulate  that  private  and  public
corporations should be included in the non-financial  enterprise
sector.  Unincorporated businesses should be included in the
household not the non-financial enterprise sector. In practice,
as table A.1 records, only Canada abides by the SNA definition.
The  major  problem  with  flow-of-funds data  is that  they  are
collected from a variety of different sources.  For example, in
the U.K. profits are largely based on tax returns to the Inland
Revenue and loans and securities issued on returns by financial
institutions  to the Bank of England.  As a consequence, sources
and uses do not in general balance and a statistical adjustment
is required to reconcile entries.10
A  fundamental  distinction  between  flow-of-funds and  company
accounts is that the former only relate to domestic activities
while  the  latter  are  constructed  on  a  world-wide  basis
including foreign subsidiaries.  Thus issues of bond and equity
securities are restricted to those made on domestic markets in
flow-of-funds accounts but  include issues on  all  markets  in
10  There is no statistical adjustment in Germany. Instead,
adjustments  are  made  to  recorded  items  to  eliminate  any
discrepancy.
27company accounts.  Company accounts are therefore more suitable
for  analysing how different countries' corporate sector  fund
themselves  but  flow-of-funds  allow  the  contribution  of  a
domestic sector's financial  system to be identified.
Overall there is a presumption that company accounts are more
accurate  than  flow-of-funds.  However,  company  accounting
analyses  are  lengthy  exercises,  frequently  involving  the
manipulation of very  large data banks.  As yet comprehensive
information is only available on the U.K.  Even here there are
serious discontinuities in aggregate series.  For example, in
1977  the  sample  of  U.K.  company  accounts was  extended  from
firms quoted on the Stock Exchange to a representative sample
of all companies.
For other countries, aggregate company accounts constructed by
the  OECD  have  had  to  be  used.  These  suffer  from  similar
discrepancies  in  definitions  of  sectors  to  flow-of-funds.
Eventually,  comprehensive accounting  information on  the  five
countries of the study will be.available which will provide a
greater  degree  of  comparability than  has  been  available  to
date.  In the meantime, more emphasis is placed in this article
on  flow-of-funds  sources.  The  relative  merits  of  company
accounts and flow-of-funds are summarized in Table A.2.
28Table A.1  Definitions  of Non-Financial  Enterprise Sectors
Country  Definition
Canada  As for SNA
Finland  Includes unincorporated enterprises
France  Excludes large public corporations
Germany  Includes unincorporated enterprises
Italy  Excludes some public corporations
Japan  Excludes large public corporations
U.K.  Excludes public corporations
U.S.  Includes unincorporated enterprises,
excludes public corporations
29Table A.2  A Comparison of Flow-of-Funds  and Company Accounts
as Descriptions  of the Funding of Industry
Flow-of-Funds  Company Accounts




Coverage  Comprehensive  Limited,
of companies  sometimes very limited
Coverage  Domestic  Global
of items
Internal
Consistency  Poor  Good
Quality of  Can be very poor  Good
Data
30Appendix 2: Derivation of financial statistics
This study differs from previous international comparisons in
both the  data  it uses  and the  way  in which  those  data  are
presented.
(i)  The data  Most existing international  comparisons use stock
data from company balance sheets to derive gearing levels.  Two
serious  objections  have  been  raised  against  this  approach.
First, in the absence of inflation corrections, capital stock
and equity valuations can be substantially underrecorded.  In
Japan  revaluations  of  company  accounts are  uncommon  and  in
Germany they are forbidden by law.  As Aoki  (1984) has noted,
the  failure  of  Japanese  accounts  to  revalue  a6sets,  in
particular land, has resulted in Japanese gearing levels being
considerably overstated.  Secondly, book values of assets and
reserves are sensitive to depreciation schedules. 11 Accounting
conventions on depreciation vary appreciably across countries,
partly in response to differences in corporate tax regimes.
Problems with accountina valuations have led several authors to
advocate the use of market valuations.  However, consideration
of  the  use  of market valuations suggests a  more  fundamental
objection to  stock measures.  Market  valuations  respond not
only  to  inflows and outflows of new  financial resources but
also  to  changes  in  valuations  of  existing  resources.
Valuations  serve  many  useful  purposes but  do not  assist  in
measuring financial flows.
To  see this,  consider a  company that  purchases  land  on the
uncertain prospect of striking oil. Suppose that the land costs
£1 million  and  the  company  funds this  entirely  from a  bank
loan.  Assuming no other resources, its initial gearing is 100
percent.  If  the  company  subsequently strikes  oil  and  the
valuation of the land rises to £100 million, its gearing level
11  For a convincing demonstration of this point see Fisher
and McGowan (1983).  See also Harcourt (1965).
31will drop to 1 percent.  If it does not, then values of both
land and debt fall to £100,000 and the company is insolvent.
The outcome of explorations  appropriately affects valuations of
debt  and  equity  but  does  not  alter  the  way  in  which  the
original investment was financed.
For this reason flows are used in preference to stocks.  One
implication  of  using  flows  rather  than  stocks  is  that
retentions are defined on a gross of depreciation rather than a
net  basis.  The  reason  for  this  is  that  by  subtracting
depreciation,  financing  is  being  distorted  by  accountants
estimates of valuation changes.  These should not be part of a
sources of funds account and are in any event  inconsistently
measured across countries.
(ii) Data presentation  All financing proportions are recorded
on a net basis: acquisition of financial assets are subtracted
from  increases  in  corresponding liabilities.  The  rationale
behind  using  net  financing  proportions  is  that  aggregate
corporate financing figures attempt to answer the question, in
what  form did  the non-financial corporate sector as a  whole
fund  its physical  investment.  Intra-corporate sector  flows
should  net  out  and  offsetting  flows  should  be  eliminated.
Thus,  for example, from the perspective of the company sector
as  a  whole  new  equity  issues by  one company are negated by
repurchases  of equity of equal magnitude by another company.
Any other approach leads to nonsensical results.
Consider,  for example, a  company that  is required to make  a
compensating deposit of  £30 for each £100 of finance raised.
Compensating deposits are common  in Japan  and the U.S.  The
company has raised  £100 gross but only £70.  But suppose the
company voluntarily holds £40 in deposits; should it be treated
as having raised £70 or £60?  Clearly net financing raised from
the bank in this period has been £60.  It may choose at a later
date to increase this to £70 but the additional £10 has to be
attributed to the period in which financial assets are reduced.
32Economic theory does not currently allow r 'kations in stocks
of  financial  assets  to  be  distinguished  trom  increases  in
financial assets.  When  a  robust theoretical distinction  is
available  then  separate  classification will  be  appropriate.
Control theory offers just such a distinction  by distinguishing
finance  by  degrees  of  intervention.  Ironically  then,  the
theory that this paper emphasizes will in time invalidate the
netting approach that has been advocated here.  However, at the
current time the appropriate null hypotheses that should guide
the construction of financing data are Modigliani and Miller
irrelevance  propositions  and  corporate  taxation  models.
Tables A.3 and A.4 record definitions of net as well as gross
flows for U.K. company accounting and flow-of-funds  data.
In moving  from  single projects to company finance, flows  in
different  time  periods  have  to  be  aggregated.  The  most
straightforward  approach  is  simply  to  average  financing
proportions.  However, that does not take account of amounts of
finance raised and  so puts undue  emphasis on periods of low
investment.  Instead, averages could be created by revaluing
flows of different classes of  finance to constant prices and
then aggregating them.  If a capital goods price index is used
for  revaluations,  this  is  equivalent  to  weighting  financing
proportions by gross levels of investment at constant prices.
An appealing alternative is to weight by depreciated values of
investment at constant prices.  This answers the question, what
would the capital structure of a  company be if it replicated
its existing capital stock using the same sources of finance as
it employed in the past.
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